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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE GUNBELT: 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
El izabeth Bury 
A critique of Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, 
Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick's 
The Rise of the Gunbe/t 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)  
The Rise of  the Gunbelt, a recently published work by Arin Markusen, Peter 
Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, paints a portrait of the geography 
of military procurement contracting in America. A significant aspect of this 
geography is the uneven distribution of contracts between regions. Markusen 
et al. describe the areas of concentration as a gunbelt, stretching "from the 
state of Washington through California to the desert states of the Southwest, 
on through Texas and the Great Plains, across to Florida, and discontinuously 
up the East Coast to New England" (p. 3). The stated purposes of the book 
are to describe this gun belt, "what is it, where is it and what does it do 7" and 
also to describe how the concentration of military spending has shifted over 
time and why these shifts have occurred (p. 4). The authors address these 
questions by presenting empirical data that show the uneven distribution of 
military procurement contracts and how this distribution has changed in the 
postwar era. A major strength of their work lies in the highly detailed case 
studies of several of the most significant agglomerations of military production 
activity. The case studies give anecdotal evidence that demonstrates how and 
why shifts in the concentration of procurement contracts have occurred. 
While the authors succeed in answering many of the questions they pose for 
themselves in the introduction, their efforts are substantially undermined by 
their failure to address one simple question: how important is the gunbelt? This 
lacuna would not be so serious were it not for the many unsupported hyperbolic 
statements the authors make indicating that they believe the gunbelt to be of 
major significance. In the opening paragraphs of the introduction, they state 
that the gunbelt has been of "overwhelming importance" (p. 3) in causing the 
huge shift of population and economic vitality from the rustbelt to the sunbelt/ 
gun belt over the past forty years. "The gunbelt is a major the major phenome­
non in the contemporary economic map of America" (p. 8, emphasis theirs) . " In 
large part, . . .  [the] differential growth rates and income effects [ in the states 
over the past forty years) were the result of mil itary spending differentials and 
the construction of high-tech industrial complexes" (p. 9). Indeed, the entire 
tone of the book indicates that the authors believe the gunbelt to have been 
of overarching importance in these shifts. The Rise of the Gunbelt goes beyond 
a simple description of the geography of mil itary pmcurement to assert that 
such defense spending has been the one major determinant of differential 
rates of regional growth in the United States in the post-World War II era. 
Markusen et al. fail to cite more than anecdotal evidence to support these 
claims, however. They do not discuss in any depth the empirical evidence 
available in the small but not totally insignificant literature surrounding the 
topic. They might also have conducted some relatively simple statistical tests 
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to provide at least a rough indication of the scale of the gunbelt's importance 
in regional economic change. This paper offers such a test, and will show that 
military spending does have a statistically significant correlation with regional 
economic growth. But it also shows that this correlation is small enough to 
support only a more qualified version of the authors' thesis. Bolton ( 1 966) 
and O'hUallachain ( 1 987) obtain similar results using different methodologies. 
These results provide evidence that the Gunbe/t authors have overstated their 
conclusions, though in the process they have drawn attention to a significantly 
underexamined cause of regional economic change in the United States. 
Testing the Importance of the Gun belt in Regional Economic Change 
In their examination of the rise of the gunbelt as a regional phenomenon, 
Markusen et al. focus most heavily on the post-World War II period. The 
authors cite two subperiods, in particular, as being significant in the gunbelt's 
growth and consolidation: the missile buildup of the mid-1 950s and the Carter/ 
Reagan buildup from the late 1 970s through the 1 980s (p. 9). 1 
Roger Bolton's 1 966 doctoral dissertation provides a thorough examination 
of the impact ofthe 1 950s cold war buildup on regional economies. He estima­
ted the importance of growth in defense-related income to overall growth in 
income from other ''exogenous" sectors.2 H is findings indicate that during lhe 
period from 1 952 to 1 962 almost half of the states had their income growth 
greatly or moderately stimulated by defense-related income. 3 He concludes, 
however, that "over the 1 952-62 period as a whole, no state depended entirely 
- or even nearly entirely - on defense income for growth" (Bolton 1 966: 1 04). 
He further states: 
The results of these tests imply a positive, but not strong. 
relationship between defense income and growth in total 
personal income, and a positive but even weaker relation­
ship between defense income and per capita personal 
income" (p. 1 04). 
Bolton's work was well-researched and rests on strong empirical evidence. 
H is statistical tests were in accordance with accepted practice. Because Bolton 
dealt so thoroughly with the question of the impact of the 1 950s buildup, this 
paper will concentrate on the period stretching from 1 977 through the mid-
1 980s, which Markusen et al. cite as the second significant gunbelt era. 
Testing the Impact of Defense Spending on Regional 
Growth: 1 977-1 986 
This paper presents a simple test of the impact of defense spending on 
regional growth between 1 977 and 1 986. This period stretches from the 
beginning of the Carter /Reagan buildup through the most recent year for 
which strong data on regional growth were available. 
The following implicit hypothesis of Markusen et al. will be tested: defense 
spending. particularly procurement spending. has been the one major determi­
nant of differential rates of regional growth in the United States from 1 977 to 
1 986. 
If this hypothesis is to be accepted, then a region's proportional share of 
defense spending should correlate strongly with its proportional share of 
growth. 
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I n  order to test the hypothesis, measures of both defense procurement 
spending and regional growth are needed. It  will then be possible to use ordi­
nary least squares regression to test the degree to which defense-procurement 
spending explains variation in regional growth. Unfortunately, data availability 
constrains the selection of both the unit of analysis and the specific variables. 
The Unit of Analysis 
The ideal unit of analysis for such a test would be that of the integrated 
regional economy. In statistical terms, this corresponds most closely to the 
metropolitan statistical area as defined by the Bureau of the Census. While 
measures of metropolitan area growth are available, data . regarding military 
procurement are not. 4 The state is the lowest level for which data regarding 
military procurement are available, and it is therefore at the level of the state 
that the hypothesis will be tested. In their own presentation of the empirical 
evidence showing the uneven distribution of procurement contracts, Markusen 
et al. use both the state and, more often, the multi-state census region as the 
unit of analysis. 
The Defense Procurement Variable 
In addition to the difficulties associated with the level of analysis, there are 
other problems associated with the defense procurement variable. The Depart­
ment of Defense publishes annual procurement figures under the title Prime 
Contracts by State. These data are reported according to the location of the 
prime contractor and do not necessarily reflect the actual location of all prod­
uction; considerable amounts of subcontracting occur in the industry. Bolton 
went to considerable pains to adjust his data in order to correct for some of 
these problems, and was successful in creating a set of estimates that more 
accurately reflected the location of actual production (Bolton 1 966: Ch. 5) .  
However, such complicated adjustments are. outside of the �ope of this study. 
Since there is evidence that subcontracting tends to follow the same patterns 
as prime contracting (Malecki 1 984; Karaska 1 967), and that good time series 
data on subcontracting do not exist, the prime contract data must stand in 
default as the best available approximation of military procurement spending. 
though results shall be interpreted with some caution due to this problem. 
The Gunbelt authors make a somewhat more detailed examination of this issue, 
and also conclude that. the prime contract data is the best available approxima­
tion of spending (Ch. 2). 
It  should also be noted that while the Department of Defense is responsible 
for the lion's share of defense dollars, both NASA and the Department of Energy 
are also involved in defense procurement to a limited extent. NASA is involved 
in satellites and the space shuttle and the DOE is involved in nuclear weapon 
production (Malecki 1 984: 34.). This provides an additional caveat to an over­
interpretation of test results. 
If these problems do in fact seriously skew the defense spending variable, 
the r-squared and t-statistics obtained in the regression analysis will be biased 
towards 0. Failure to find significant relationship (low t-statistic) between the 
variables could be due to such problems, but significant findings cannot be the 
result. The strength of the correlation (r-squared statistic) could also be under­
estimated, but the scale of the underestimation would have to be somewhat 
similar to the deviations of subcontracting patterns from those of prime con-
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tracts. These possible biases will be considered in further detail in the interpre­
tation of regression results. 
One final problem is the time lag that often exists between the awarding of 
the contract and the actual purchase of goods and services by the contractor. 
This is controlled for in the test in two ways. First, cumulative figures, reflecting 
prime contract awards over the entire ten-year period, will be used instead of 
single-year figures. Second, results involving various time lag rates will be 
reported, including models with no time lag. a one-year, a two-year, and a 
three-year lag rate. Bolton reported in 1 966 that almost all the contract is usu­
ally paid within three years, and this seems a logical limit to expected impacts. 
The Growth Variable 
A variety of measures can be used to show economic growth. Among these 
are employment growth, income growth, and growth in gross product. Since 
gross product numbers are the most comprehensive measure, and official 
gross state product figures recently became available from the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, these have been chosen as the growth variable. 5 
Standardizing the Variables 
In order to produce a reliable result from the regression analysis, it is netes­
sary to standardize the variables. This will avoid undesirable effects such as 
those resulting from inflation or size (i.e. large states have large amounts of 
spending) . Also, the variables will be expressed as cumulative sums over the 
ten-year period to avoid the time-lag constraints identified previously. 
Because of difficulties in deciding exactly which deflator was most appro­
priate for the prime contracts variable, 6 it was decided not to adjust for inflation 
per se. I nstead this variable was expressed in terms of each state's share of 
national prime contracts in each year, obviating the need for inflation adjust­
ment. Averaging these shares over ten years gave an average share figure for 
each state. This was then divided by each state's share of G N P  in the initial 
year in order to arrive at a location quotient for prime contracting? The logic 
of the location quotient can be expressed as: each state's share of prime con­
tracts compared to its initial share of the economy. This location quotient is 
the independent variable in the regression equation. 
A similar location quotient method was also used to standardize the gross 
state product data. These data were obtained in inflation adjusted (1 982 = 
1 00) form, so no further adjustment for inflation was made. In order to calculate 
the location quotient, the gross growth experienced by each state was calcula­
ted by finding the difference between its gross product in the initial year and 
the final year. This gross growth was then expressed as a percentage of total 
gross growth in the country to arrive at each state's share of national growth. 
This figure was divided by each state's share of the national economy in the 
initial year to arrive at a location quotient for growth. The logic of this location 
quotient can be expressed as: each state's share of national economic growth 
compared to its initial share of the national economy. A state that accounted 
for 10 percent of economic growth in the nation, while itself only comprising 
5 percent of the national economy at the beginning of the period, would there­
fore have a location quotient of 2.00, indicating that it had twice as large a 
share of national growth than would have been expected, given its initial 
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share of the national economy. This location quotient for growth is the 
dependent variable in the regression equation. 
Interpreting the Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the regression equations for each of the four lag 
scenarios. All lag scenarios show that there is a statistically significant relation­
ship between a state's proportional share of military spending and its propor­
tional share of growth in gross product. In all cases the significance is at the p 
= .01 level or greater. In no case is this relationship particularly strong. how­
ever; r-squared never rises above 0.22. The data clearly show that military 
spending is not the overriding determinant of growth; other factors account for 
a far greater proportion of the variation in growth rates than does military 
spending. 
The lag effects are interesting: the amount of correlation rises as the lag 
increases. This indicates that the effects of contracts awarded in one year are 
felt over subsequent years, and not primarily in the initial contract year alone. 
Contracts awarded from 1 977 to 1 984 are more strongly correlated with 
growth from 1 980 to 1 986 than contracts awarded from 1 977 to 1 986 are corre­
lated with growth from 1 977 to 1 986. 
Table 1 
Regression Results using Lag Variables 
X = Location Quotient, Military Contracts 
Y = Location Quotient, Regional Growth 
Scenario 1 :  
Standard 
Error 
� .2f.1. 
X Standard · 
Coeffi· Error R 
cient ..2!.!. sauared 
I· 
statis-
...!!L 
No Lag 0.74 0.63 0.38 0. 1 3  0. 1 5  2.92 
Contracts 1 977-1 986 
Growth 1 977·1 986 
5cenMio 2: 
1 -Year Lag 0.61 0.71 0.48 0.14 0. 1 9  3.35 
Contracts 1 977-1 985 
Growth 1 978-1 986 
5cenario 3: 
2-YeaJ" Lag 0.53 0.76 0.53 0. 1 5  0.20 3.47 
Contracts 1 977 ·1 984 
Growth 1 979·1 986 
5cenMio 4: 
3-YeaJ" Lag 0.51 0.65 0.48 0. 1 3  0.22 3.71 
Contracts 1 977-1983 
Growth 1 980-1986 
1 70 
t Signi· 
ficance 
Level 
p = .01 
p = .01 
p = .01 
p = .001 
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As stated previously, the problems with the prime contracting data serving as 
a proxy for military procurement spending give a strong caveat to an overinter­
pretation of these results. In statistical terms, all that has been shown is that 
the relationship between proportional gross product growth and a state's pro­
portional share of prime contracts is significant but not strong. Work locations 
in states that differ from that of the main headquarters of the prime contractor, 
the significant amount of subcontracting that occurs and procurement spending 
by NASA and the Department of Energy add uncertainty to the picture. As stated 
previously, any biases resulting from these problems would tend to underesti­
mate both the significance and size ofthe correlation between defense spending 
and regional growth. Since results were found to be highly significant, even with 
these biases in the data, the only question that remains is whether or not the size 
of the correlation is underestimated by these flaws. The significant question is 
whether subcontracting, out-of-state production, and procurement spending 
by other agencies could really change the pattern of spending enough to make 
the correlation much higher. Given the findings of Malecki ( 1 984) and Karaska 
(1 967) that subcontracting follows patterns similar to those of prime con­
tracting, this seems unlikely. The test results reported here provide, therefore, 
a crude, but likely relatively accurate, measure of the extent to which defense 
procurement patterns explain differential rates of regional economic growth. 
The results of this test can be compared with those reported by 
O'hUallachain (1987), who found a correlation of similar magnitude (r-squared 
= 0.27) and significance (p = 0.001 )  when he examined the effects of military 
production on manufacturing employment. It should be noted that 
O'hUallachain was able to correct for some of the subcontracting problems 
associated with the military spending variable by using data on state ship­
ments to the Department of Defense. This data captures some of the effects 
of first-round subcontracting, but was available for only one year. 1 983. 
However, this improvement in his independent variable is offset by some 
serious conceptual problems with the dependent variable. 8 
The similarity between the results found by O'hUallachain and those of the 
test reported here is rather remarkable, especially given the qualitative differ­
ence in using employment and gross product as dependent variables. 
Both sets of results are consistent with those of Mehay and Solnick ( 1 990), 
who tested the impact of defense spending on state economic growth between 
1 976 and 1 985. In their multivariate analyses of determinants of growth in 
personal income and manufacturing employment, they found that De.fartment 
of Defense investment outlays had a statistically significant effects. How­
ever, because of their multivariate methodology, it is impossible to ascertain 
the relative contribution of this variable to their model. 
In interpreting the strength of the correlation between military contracting 
and growth, it is important to consider that it would be highly unlikely for any 
one variable to be able to account for all of the variation in a complex phe­
nomenon such as regional growth. Differential growth rates are likely to be 
accounted for by a myriad of factors, some quantifiable, others less so. In  
such a case, the r-squares found here, in the range of 0. 1 5  to  0.22, could be 
subjectively viewed as relatively high, considering that few other variables are 
likely to explain as much of the variation in growth. Such an assertion is, 
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however, merely a subjective interpretation unless it is accompanied by a 
more thorough statistical examination of the importance of other factors. 
Conclusion 
This paper has given evidence regarding the relationship between military 
procurement spending and regional growth. These results, along with those 
of Bolton (1 966), O'hUallachain (1 987), and Mehay and Solnick (1 990), 
support the overall theme of The Rise of the Gunbelt while suggesting that 
Markusen et al. overstate the gunbelt's significance as the one major cause of 
disparities in regional economic growth. 
One of the reasons that defense spending may not contribute as much to 
regional growth as might be expected could be related to multiplier effects. 
Because of Pentagon bureaucracy, an emphasis on secrecy, diversion of skilled 
employees from other sectors, and relatively high salary levels, it may be that 
military spending does not ripple through the economy to the extent that 
other types of spending do, and that fewer jobs are created per dollar of 
military spending than other types of investment. By raising the wage levels 
and competing for skilled workers, military contracting might actually inhibit 
other types of industry from expanding in an area. 
With 1 5  to 22 percent of the variation in regional growth explained, it is clear 
that the empirical data indicate that military procurement spending explains 
only a fraction of the variation in regional growth between 1 977 and 1 986. 
Markusen et al. have identified an important factor that has contributed to the 
enormous changes in the industrial geography of the United States in recent 
years, but it is only one factor. There are likely to be many people who would 
prefer to ignore the significance of this politically charged sector of the economy 
entirely. Markusen et al. present a fine description of the geography of military 
procurement, but by not presenting any empirical eVidence regarding its signifi­
cance, The Rise of the Gunbelt allows these doobters to continue to ignore the 
importance of this spending. Skeptics could easily dismiss the work of 
Markusen et al. as mere anecdote and unsupported hyperbole. This would be 
a shame. This paper has shown that there is indeed support for a more qualified 
version of the Gun belt's thesis, and to have the work dismissed would impede, 
rather than further advance, the goal of understanding the causes of regional 
economic shifts in the U.S. While Markusen et al. have drawn attention to a 
conspicuously underexamined cause of these shifts, their work would have been 
far stronger had they systematically investigated the empirical significance of 
the gunbelt phenomenon whose other characteristics they describe so well. 
NOTES 
1 Marlcusen et al. indicate that during other periods, such as the Korean and Vietnam 
War eras, procurement was less heavily skewed towards gunbelt areas because of the 
need for the types of basic armaments supplied by plants in the industrial heartland, as 
opposed to the more high-tech missile and space systems in which gunbelt states tend 
to specialize. 
2Bolton uses the term •exogenous• to refer to those sectors that comprise a state's 
export base, as per economic base theoty. 
31t should be noted that Marlcusen et al. actually cite these results of Bolton's, though 
they confuse the results for some states and regions, and misreport which specific 
1 72  
Importance of Gunbelt, Bury 
areas had their "growth greatly stimulated' or 'growth moderately stimulated.' The 
majority of these discrepancies were in support of their thesis. 
41t should be mentioned, however, that information on total federal government 
procurement is available by MSA, and that if this could be adjusted to reflect only 
military procurement, then tests using this data would undoubtedly be superior to 
those reported here. 
SAdditionally, Bolton (1 966) examined income effects while O'hUallachain (1 987) exam­
ined employment effects, leaving gross product effects the one major area as yet unex­
amined. The gross stale product data are published by the Department of Commerce's 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Figures used for this study were obtained in computer­
readable form from the Regional Research Institute at West Virginia University. 
6some researchers use the deflator for government purchases for this purpose, but it 
was not clear that defense dollars are subject to this type of inflationary pressure in the 
local economies in which they are spent. The consumer price index and the GNP 
deflator did not seem perfectly appropriate either. 
7 Originally, a state's average share of GNP over the entire period in question was used 
as the denominator in calculating both the location quotients, but some concerns arose 
over this formulation. Since the hypothesis being tested predicts that a state's share of 
GNP will increase if it has disproportionately high amounts of military spending. the 
average share of GNP will be skewed upwards by this increase. Since the denominator 
is therefore larger, the importance of military spending is underestimated. Thus, the 
second versions of the location quotients were calculated, using as the denominator the 
state's share of GNP in the initial year only. Results of the regression analyses showed 
slightly improved correlation and significance in each of the four lag scenarios, when 
the location quotient variables were calculated using this initial-year share approach 
(average increase in r-squared < .03). Since correlation is slightly higher with the 
initial-year formulation, it is this formulation that is presented in the text. Data and 
results using the entire period GNP share formulation are available from the author. 
8As his dependent variable, O'hUallachain uses the percentage growth in manufacturing 
employment for the period 1 977-1 984. This variable is flawed in two ways. First, it is 
hard to see how military production in 1 983 could be expected to impact growth in 
manufacturing employment in earlier years. While O'hUallachain does not draw atten­
tion to this discrepancy in time periods, he does support himself somewhat by assert­
ing that locational patterns of production did not change much between 1 977 and 
1 984. The second problem relates to the well-known difficulties associated with using 
growth rates that can fluctuate significantly when derived from a small initial base, 
such as that found in states with smaller manufacturing sectors. 
9rheir DOD investment variable included spending related to prime contract procure­
ment, research and development, and military construction. According to Mehay and 
Solnick, procurement spending accounts for almost 78 percent of this variable (p. 
485). They also tested a DOD operations and maintenance variable which largely 
measured the effects of DOD payroll and found it to be less significant. Mehay and 
Solnick used three specific model types in order to correct for problems such as serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. They assert that the Parks model provides the best 
estimates. Their OLS and covariance models do not find a statistically satisfactory level 
of signifiance for the DOD investment variable. 
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